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ABSTRACT
Few companies recognize the big bite that thefts, both large and small, take out
of their profit margin. It is estimated that theft in some form absorbs 5 percent of all
business revenues, which translates into about $652 billion in losses per year. Small
businesses take a disproportionate share of the hit. The purpose of this paper is to
highlight the rapidly expanding scope of the employee theft problem and to suggest
common sense Risk Management techniques that companies can use to prevent losses
and to reduce the damages from those that occur. In many cases, the loss control
measures are inexpensive and easy to implement.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is widespread agreement that occupational fraud and abuse is big
business, that it is widespread, and that it is beginning to reach epidemic proportions
(Coffin, p.8). Firms of every size in all industrial categories and at all organizational
levels are victims of fraud and abuse by their own employees. Occupational fraud—
whether asset misappropriation, corruption, or fraudulent statements—is one of the
costliest problems facing business today, particularly small private firms (Anonymous
1, p. 11), and despite massive efforts to contain it, it is one of the fastest growing
industries in the country. Thefts of company assets more than doubled from 1999 to
2004 (Anonymous 2, p. 56) as the employee theft problem began to spin out of
control. Occupational fraud affects, or has the potential to affect, every business in
the country (ACFE, p. 8). Risk management of theft and other crime exposures is
extremely important, and no employer should be naive concerning the magnitude of
the problem or blissfully think or hope that it will never happen to them.
The purpose of this paper is to heighten employers’ sensitivity to the employee
dishonesty problem and to help them better understand and control employee theft.
The paper emphasizes how critical it is for them to learn as much as possible about
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occupational fraud and the devastating financial impact that it can have on a firm’s
bottom line or even its solvency. Perhaps even worse, insider theft can insidiously
corrode trust and confidence between employer and worker—the glue that holds the
workplace together. It saps employee morale and diverts the attention of managers
from other tasks.
To achieve its purpose, the remainder of the paper is divided into seven
sections. The first explains the scope of the employee crime problem, and the second
offers lessons and insights into who commits occupational fraud. The third section
discusses the elements that must simultaneously be present for fraud to exist, and the
fourth section discusses reasons why more thefts are not reported. The fifth section
provides some commonsense observations about how the impact of theft can be
prevented or reduced—what companies can do to help deter fraudulent conduct. The
sixth section explains how the risk of financial loss by theft can be transferred to an
insurance company, and the final section contains the summary and conclusion of the
study.
II. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Statistics on employee theft are astounding. U.S. companies lose more to
internal fraud than to shoplifting, although shoplifting incidents tend to get more press
(Ryan, p. 8). According to one source, employee theft and fraud accounts for 30-50
percent of all company failures (Lurz, p. 112), and in the retail field, theft accounts for
80 percent of all losses (Ritter, p. 25). These findings have serious implications for
small businesses that face increasing margin pressure from all directions. It means
that billions of dollars of profits hemorrhage away each year and that the premiums
they pay for commercial insurance are driven up. It also means that consumers end up
paying higher prices for the goods and services they purchase.
Statistics on employee dishonesty gathered by the Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) show that firms lose on average $9 per day per employee
for insider theft (Lurz, p. 112). The median dollar loss came to $159,000, which
amounts to about 5 percent of all annual revenue, and for all businesses, the tab comes
to about $652 billion per year (ACFE, p. 8), making fraud an industry of its own
(Coenen, p. 1). Another source, using a different methodology, suggests that the
problem is more rampant than the ACFE figures indicate. It reports that employee
theft costs businesses an astounding 20 percent of every dollar earned (Gips, p. 16).
The repercussions of employee theft are far more harmful to the bottom line than has
traditionally been recognized, and the impact is more far-reaching. Three in five
privately held companies can expect to be victimized by employee-perpetrated theft of
funds or equipment in any given year (Anonymous 1, p. 11).
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III. WHO ARE THE "ACTORS"?
Trusted employees from all walks of life, from all income ranges, and in every
business discover creative ways to make their job more rewarding. Every employee is
a potential suspect when it comes to who is capable of committing fraud, i.e., from a
low-level staff member to a highly educated, hard working, seemingly mature and
responsible senior officer. Some observers say that 6-8 percent of all employees have
taken or have considered taking money from their employer (Knapshaefer, p. 45).
There are more ways for an insider to take advantage of their workplace than most
executives can imagine. Too often, companies set themselves up to be victimized by
theft. The opportunity for employees to divert company funds into their own pockets
is simply handed to them because of weak internal controls and oversight (Cressey, p.
30).
The level of authority a person holds within the organization tends to have a
significant impact on the size of loss in a fraud scheme. Most insider thieves are not
aloof loners, introverted nerds, or high school dropouts. Rather, the typical
perpetrator is a married, college-educated white male who exhibits all the qualities
one looks for in an employee—high integrity, trustworthiness, and devotion to the
job—and who is higher up the organizational ladder (Tyska, p. 17). While there may
be more stings by rank-and-file employees (41.2 percent) simply because of their
greater numbers, the take per person is much larger at the higher levels. On average,
losses from fraud by owners and executives are nearly five times larger than those of
managers and 13 times higher than those caused by employees (ACFE, p. 5). Senior
members and owners of an organization are more likely to be in positions of trust, to
have access to the money and books, and to have authority to override or change
control procedures in order to conceal the fraud (ACFE, p. 42).
Men commit 61 percent of all insider crime offenses, and the median loss
caused by men is two and one-half times greater than those caused by women,
$250,000 to $102,000, respectively. At least a part of this disparity is a result of men
tending to hold more management and executive-level positions in many
organizations. As the perpetrator’s age rises, so do the losses from their fraud. The
median loss for those age 60 and over is 28 times greater than that for those 25 or
younger. There is also a strong correlation between the education level of the
perpetrator and the size of the median loss. The median loss caused by those with
postgraduate degrees is over four times greater than losses caused by those with high
school diplomas (ACFE, pp. 44-45).
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The costliest theft cases occur in organizations with fewer than 100 employees.
One important reason why small companies bear the brunt is that small companies
cannot afford the kinds of sophisticated internal controls and systems that prevent or
deter embezzlement. Schemes at small businesses cost an average of $190,000,
higher than the median loss in even the largest organizations (ACFE, p. 5), and help
contribute to the short lifespan of such businesses (Mohsin, p. 271).
It is interesting to note the effect of computers on the average size of insider
thefts. Technology has dramatically increased the size of insider theft jobs. The
average employee embezzlement comes to $25,000, but higher dollar volumes are
associated with computer-assisted thefts, which average $430,000. When coupled
with poor controls, computer embezzlement can be very difficult to detect, especially
when it involves sophisticated measures, collusion, and the falsification of documents
(Knapshaefer, p. 44, and Lurz, p. 112). The massive infusion of computer technology
into the workplace has clearly raised the bar for the minimum level of loss control
protection most companies need.
IV. THE FRAUD MODEL
Understanding the elements that precipitate employee fraud is the first step in a
program to prevent it. Criminologist Donald R. Cressey interviewed nearly 200
incarcerated embezzlers in the late 1940s and developed a fraud model, which has
become known as the “Fraud Triangle,” containing three factors that are necessary
and sufficient conditions for fraud to result. The three factors are perceived pressure
facing the perpetrator, perceived opportunity to commit and conceal the crime, and the
person’s attitude or rationalization of the fraudulent act. While later researchers have
refined the Cressey model, it remains much as he presented it almost 60 years ago.
The Fraud Triangle is depicted below, and the three key variables that must be present
simultaneously for a fraud to occur are discussed in the following sections.
Opportunity
The Fraud
Triangle

Pressure

Rationalization

Source: Adapted from Auditing Standards Board (ASB), Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, New
York: AICPA. Issued October 2002.
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V. MOTIVES/PRESSURES TO STEAL
Motives for stealing rest on unquantifiable human instincts and are as highly
subjective, messy, and diverse as the nature of human character. The three major
reasons are lifestyle, finances, and emotions. The lifestyle factor becomes operative
when workers steal money to pay off an out-of-control credit card debt (McCormick,
p. 122) or to enhance their lifestyle with the purchase of a bigger house, faster car,
expensive recreational property, or extravagant vacation (Wells, p. 1). They take
advantage of an opportunity to steal because of weak or unenforced control policies
and procedures. They may rationalize that everyone else is doing it.
The financial factor comes into play when the worker needs more money to
meet medical costs or to defray other emergency expenses. The worker may see the
employer as a faceless and avaricious giant with a corrupt ideology who will never
notice the loss of a few dollars, a few pieces of apparel, a few supplies, or a little bit of
merchandise (Ritter, p. 25). Some workers may steal for the thrill of it, or they may
appreciate and need the challenge of stealing—using their sophisticated understanding
of the firm’s technology or its financial statements to mastermind an elaborate scheme
(Knapshaefer, p. 43).
The emotional factor becomes operative when an inequity-sensitive worker
feels that he/she is not being treated well. He/she may have missed a promotion or
feel underpaid, or feel an unfairness in pay, perhaps because a proximal referent in a
similar position in the same or a different company is earning a higher salary and/or
working fewer hours (Fishman, p. 61). Feeling overworked and/or underpaid, he/she
seeks revenge in the most convenient way possible.
VI. OPPORTUNITY TO STEAL
A simplistic answer as to why employees steal is to say that they are in a
position to take what does not belong to them and that it is easy. After all, employees
have full access to the crime scene (Ryan, p. 8). They know the firm’s procedures and
policies, cultural norms, and networked information systems, and they will likely
know their fellow workers and their habits. In many types of business, i.e.,
convenience stores, employees work with only one or two other employees and may
be left alone on a routine basis. They have ready access to the cash register and to
concealed places where high-ticket items are kept, thus optimizing the opportunity to
steal. In such idyllic circumstances, some workers cannot resist the temptation to take
advantage of and exploit any weaknesses or vulnerabilities they see in management
controls.
Distilled to its basics, the primary reason employees steal is that employers
create the environment for it. They steal by design and exploit opportunity simply
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because they can, i.e., the employee is in a position to override all internal accounting
or financial procedures. There is ineffective oversight (Ritter, p. 25). The failure to
consistently enforce and constantly monitor management policy, procedures, and
accounting controls and to create an ethical environment that discourages dishonesty
will inevitably lead to a loss of assets that can devastate the company’s profit margin.
1. EMPLOYEE RATIONALIZATION
In most cases, employee theft begins innocently enough (Ritter, p. 25). For
example, the thief might be an executive who has extensive knowledge of how the
company operates, learns how to ignore or circumvent established controls, and is the
beneficiary of a system that functions on the assumption that he is trustworthy. He
may lose his moral compass and “dust the cash register” to supplement his salary for
$10,000 cash to capitalize on a business opportunity for which funding is not
otherwise available. Or he may be dealing with a personal issue such as a gambling
or drinking addiction or even a mental problem that leads him to a life of crime. He
may view the transgression not as stealing but simply as borrowing funds that will be
repaid when his financial situation improves or when he achieves the success that has
heretofore eluded him. He thinks the company is too big to notice. He is probably
firmly convinced that he is smart enough to conceal his duplicity, and he usually does
for a while. The median length from the time the scheme begins until it is detected is
18 months (ACFE, p. 4).
Alternatively, the culprit might be a single-parent mother in a low-level
position who finds herself late on credit card payments or needs to purchase a bigticket item. So, she may pilfer company supplies or “short” the cash drawer for a
“little” cash to help meet the down payment on a much-needed new car. She has
every intention of returning the money next month but then “forgets” to do so. After a
period of time during which her initial attempt goes without detection, she “borrows”
money again, perhaps in a slightly larger amount, and the abuse escalates into ever
more frequent and more serious events. And the pattern continues, with the thief
becoming more anesthetized to the wrongdoing and ever more confident that she can
hide any traces of her theft. She inflicts ever more serious financial damage as the
incidents pile up.
VII. WHY MORE EMPLOYERS DON'T PROSECUTE
Employers often place great trust and have implicit faith in their employees.
They may think of them as extended family that are honest, hard-working, and have
only the company’s best interests at heart. Sometimes employers refuse to believe
that they are a victim of theft, particularly if the theft is by a long-term, trusted, and
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heretofore presumably loyal employee, right up to the moment that incontrovertible
evidence forces them to confront the awful truth.
The victimized employer is first likely to be astonished, shocked, and angry, to
feel hurt, and to experience an utter sense of betrayal. Then follows the dread of
reputation degradation—the fear that public knowledge of employee theft and
dishonesty in the organization will endanger the trust of customers and negatively
impact sales and revenue, since dishonesty or deviant behavior in one department may
be perceived by observers to be the underlying behavior across other departments
(Anonymous 2, p. 56). This helps to explain why the latest ACFE study shows that the
victim organization referred the case to a law enforcement authority only 70 percent
of the time (ACFE, p. 56). Other sources report a much lower referral rate. One
study indicated that only 40 percent of employees caught stealing are referred to the
criminal justice system and only 20 percent are required to make some form of
restitution. Almost unbelievably, the remaining 40 percent face no civil or criminal
penalty (Lurz, p. 112).
Hence, many employers choose not to prosecute the employees who prey upon
them. They would rather handle problems of occupational fraud quietly and without
police involvement (Coffin, p. 8) by discreetly firing the perpetrator and refusing to
serve as a reference in the future (Lurz, p. 112). The alternative is to face the specter
of negative publicity, embarrassment of having unwittingly fallen prey to an inside
con artist, public humiliation of the company, difficulty in getting future loans, and
enormous time obligations and costs (legal and investigative fees) of prosecuting the
guilty employee. And there is no assurance of full recovery, or any recovery, even
with a favorable verdict. Only 20 percent of all fraud losses are ever recovered,
including proceeds from restitution and insurance, and 37 percent of victim companies
never recover any funds at all (Coenen, p. 1).
Admittedly, employers face a dilemma with regard to monitoring their
employees. They wish to trust their employees, have faith in their integrity, and
create an environment of mutual confidence and respect between management and
workers. However, as stewards of the firm’s and possibly their own assets, managers
have the fiduciary responsibility to safeguard and protect those assets. Hence, some
managers have opted to use surreptitious devices such as hidden cameras to detect
employee theft. This practice may go against the grain of many small firms that
attempt to create an environment where employees are trusted. Some small firms may
feel that degradation of the work environment can lead to an adversarial worker–
employer relationship, diminished productivity, and other dysfunctions. The key is to
strike a balance between placing confidence in persons once they are hired and
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creating strong internal controls at a reasonable cost to eliminate their temptation to
steal or to commit other fraudulent acts (Knapshaefer, p. 45).
VIII. PREVENTION
A priori evidence indicates that the most cost-effective way to deal with fraud
is to prevent it. Hence, companies should exert every effort to prevent exploitation
via insider theft and fraud, though they will probably never be so clever as to design a
foolproof system to thwart all human shortcomings (Fishman, p. 60). The most
prudent measures are to screen employees for characteristics associated with low-theft
activity before hiring them and to take preventive steps after the hire by establishing
and implementing sound internal controls—checks and balances that help to prevent
fraud and to limit financial losses when fraud occurs. The company should review
these management control policies periodically and update them as needed. As an
example, when Internet channels are added, the company should make sure that this
does not open new avenues for potential fraud (Knapshaefer, p. 44).
To deter abuse and thefts, companies should look for areas of vulnerability.
Identifying the areas of operation most affected by theft enables top management to
measure the effectiveness of loss prevention and reduction programs, to focus on
problem areas that have the greatest potential for improvement, and to formulate
strategies for preventing fraudulent schemes (Anonymous 1, p. 11). While there are
no simple, foolproof solutions to the prevention of fraud, here is a list of positive,
structured loss-control initiatives gleaned from the literature, none of which require a
huge investment in infrastructure or personnel that companies can use to avoid or
mitigate the effects of theft and fraud.
1. DUAL CONTROLS
Separation of employee duties is a strategy that can help the internal control
system to work. Firms make themselves vulnerable to theft and fraud if they do not
develop and implement policies about how financial transactions are initiated,
authorized, recorded, and reviewed. Since 30 percent of all occupational fraud is
committed by employees in the accounting department (ACFE, p. 5), it is essential
that different employees should handle different accounting and financial tasks. Those
who make decisions about what equipment, materials, and supplies will be purchased
or what work will be performed should be separate from those who handle the
checkbook or are in charge of payments to suppliers or vendors. A scenario in which
ordering and payment are the responsibilities of just one person is fraught with the
danger of fraudulent expense reimbursements in the form of skimming (accepting
payment from a customer but not recording the sale), cash larceny (taking cash or
checks from daily receipts, which have been recorded, before they can be deposited in
Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, General Research, Volume 8, 2007
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the bank), kickbacks, or other forms of occupational fraud. When duties are
segregated, each area can act as a check against abuses by the others (Lurz, p. 112).
In particular, to maintain adequate cross-departmental responsibility, the
controller (with accounts-payable duties) should not supervise purchasing and
receiving. Rather, in order to minimize the opportunity for fraudulent billing
practices, the controller, purchasing agent, and receiving agent should report
separately to senior management. It is far better for the purchasing department to
negotiate the contracts for equipment or work, an operations unit such as receiving to
verify that the equipment is delivered or the work is done according to specifications,
the accounting department to process the purchase order, and senior management to
sign the check. Owners should check all orders to make sure they are accurate and of
the quality intended. A firm set of dual checks and balances (a control technique
called redundancy), with multiple executives signing off on trade contracts, funds
allocations, and disbursements, is a key way to prevent temptation and to help stem
the rising tide of employee theft and abuse. Subsequent bookkeeping adjustments,
even minor ones or adjustments made to correct an error, should be approved by the
owner or a trusted assistant (Mather, p. 8). Of course, even the most elaborate control
system can be circumvented if two or more people collude to commit the fraud (Lurz,
p. 112, and Fishman, p. 60).
Dual controls with separate decision making, authorization, and paying
functions are more important in smaller firms than larger ones. The reason is that
multiple responsibilities (i.e., asset custody and accounting responsibility) often fall
upon the shoulders of a single employee in a small firm. That person could easily
have both the opportunity and means to conceal theft. It is difficult to design
foolproof systems in such circumstances that eliminate the ability to conceal theft if
the employee is savvy enough to know the loopholes in the system and to hide those
loopholes (Knapshaefer, p. 45, and Lurz, p. 112).
A small business is particularly vulnerable if only one person is involved with
or looks at a single transaction—that is, the same person is responsible for decision
making (buying), authorizing payment, and writing the check. Any person
empowered to both record and process a transaction is in a position to engage in check
tampering—to either steal and then forge a check, issue a genuine check to a fictitious
entity, alter a legitimately issued check, duplicate (print) a counterfeit check, or
engage in some other check fraud scheme. The challenge to the management of a
small business is to find the appropriate level of staffing and to designate the
appropriate persons to have supervisory authority, without giving authority to many
people and spending inappropriate amounts for loss prevention activities
(Knapshaefer, p. 45).
Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, General Research, Volume 8, 2007

31

2. HIRING GOOD PEOPLE
The fight against theft starts with the pre-employment screening procedure for
new hires that will have access to organizational assets. The employer should use
selection and detection procedures such as conducting reference checks and running
background verification and searches to find out as much as possible about the
applicant’s previous experience with other employers and law enforcement
authorities. This information can be obtained for modest sums, in some cases as little
as $10 per employee (Mather, p. 8).
Depending on the position, screening may include drug tests, credit histories,
honesty (integrity) tests, and driver’s license and criminal records checks on all
applicants, particularly those who are in sensitive positions that involve the flow of
money or have access to checks, credit card numbers, or other items that are easily
stolen. Screening can uncover job applicants who lie on or embellish their resumes or
fail to include crucial information regarding criminal convictions and thus present a
significantly higher risk for potential problems. Pre-employment screening, because it
reduces the company’s vulnerability to the risk of theft, is an extremely important
anti-fraud technique since prevention is more cost effective in the long run than
prosecuting the employee and attempting to recover losses (Wells, p. 1). It is best for
employers to hire workers with a high level of cognitive moral development and then
to treat them as trustworthy and honest once they are hired (Appelbaum et. al., p.
175).
It is worth repeating that the company should put emphasis on hiring only the
most qualified and trustworthy employees. Managers should be educated about how
to use interview techniques that help distinguish honest from dishonest applicants.
For example, it is better to ask open-ended questions during the interview process.
Open-ended questions tend to be more revelatory about the candidate’s background,
attitudes, and behavior patterns (Ritter, p. 25). Also, there should be multiple
interviews and interviewers for each applicant (Ryan, p. 8). Taking sufficient time to
properly interview potential employees is an investment that will reap huge dividends
down the road, enabling the employer to ferret out the predatory employee who seeks
employment with the goal of defrauding the employer (ACFE, p. 55).
Interviewers should review resumes for evidence of job hunting and avoid
putting those with a multi-job history in payroll administration, accounts payable, or
other key financial positions. The interviewer should also discuss issues of ethics and
ask the candidates to discuss any ethical dilemmas they have experienced in the past
(Lurz, p. 112).
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3. ETHICS MANUAL
Employees are opportunistic about stealing on the job (Lurz, p. 112). They are
more likely to engage in occupational fraud and abuse if they know the company is
not taking an aggressive position regarding employee theft and, after weighing the
risks, believe there is a fairly good chance they will not be caught. It is well
established that the lower the risk of being caught stealing, the more likely it is that a
theft will take place. Fraud seeks the organization with the lowest level of protection
(Knapshaefer, p. 43).
The ethical culture of an organization can only rise as high as the standard set
by top management. Members of the management team have an important role as
authority figures and, as such, have the duty to initiate and implement a corporate
culture that focuses on and reinforces honesty (Appelbaum et. al., p. 175). All fraud
starts with the owner (Dennis, p. 55), and management that is perceived to be unfair
and dishonest will beget dishonest employees (Wells, p. 1). Hence, there is a need for
a written guidebook or manual containing the organization’s code of conduct and
ethics policies that emanates from and has the firm support of the senior management
of the corporation, whose ethical conduct serves as a benchmark for the organization’s
employees. The manual should be made available to every manager and to every
employee in every department.
The manual should clearly define behavior expectations, i.e., what activities are
unacceptable, the internal controls in place to prevent fraud, and the punishment for
those who do not comply. The ethics policy should become operative at the time of
new hire orientation and continue until the employee separates. Workers exposed to a
work group that condones theft will be more likely to steal (McClurg and Butler, p.
25). Hence, companies should imbue workers at the time of hire with the notion that
preventing fraud is an all-hands responsibility and that every worker is accountable
for his/her own actions and should share responsibility for the values and beliefs of
the organization.
After the hire, the firm should sponsor positive and non-accusatory loss
prevention awareness classes, workshops, and refresher briefings and provide other
broad-based education updates and reinforcement of the ethics policy on an annual
basis. Each employee should be required to sign off on the policy every year. There
should be strong and consistent signals from the organization that any form of theft is
unacceptable. The point should be driven home that ethics are not just a moral
imperative, but the foundation of good business and that employee dishonesty
eventually costs everyone in the company through higher prices and thus lower
profits, adverse publicity, and decreased morale (Wells, p. 1). If the ethics policies and
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the emphasis on integrity are in a manual, are strictly implemented and regularly
evaluated (Mohsin, p. 271), and are repeatedly mentioned in intra-company training
sessions and the sanctions for ethical shortfalls are spelled out and are vigorously
enforced, a climate is created and fostered whereby employees remain focused on
ethical behavior.
The ethics manual should be used in conjunction with well-defined accounting
procedures and written job descriptions to establish accountability for each staff
member. When lines of authority and responsibility are clearly delineated, it makes it
much easier to hold people accountable, to monitor their performance, and to
encourage them to act with integrity in the conduct of company business (Lurz, p.
112, and Mohsin, p. 271). Of course, even the clearest lines of responsibility and
authority can be abused by a dominant manager who chooses to override or
circumvent the system to commit fraud.
IX. OTHER PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Companies can use many other accounting policies and financial and
organizational control features to flag and combat potential fraud, limit or mitigate the
amount of damage that can be done, and provide optimum protection for the business,
including:
a) Accounting Policies
• Implement and strictly enforce a rule that no one in the purchasing area can
take bribes (such as inflating invoices from a vendor and in return receiving 10
percent of the invoice price as a kickback), or accept gratuities (say from a
vendor as a token of the vendor’s appreciation for their help). Nothing should
be accepted—no entertainment, no free vacation, no beverages at Christmas,
nothing. Without such controls in place, purchasing agents may be tempted to
accept kickbacks (Lurz, p. 112).
• Use an independent party who is not involved with the daily checkbook
transactions (collections and disbursements) to reconcile monthly bank
statements before they are passed to the bookkeeper, and rotate both functions
every few months (Mohsin, p. 271).
• Document and scrutinize all reimbursable expenses incurred by employees. It
is easier to detect and trace fraudulent transactions and avoid paying phantom
or padded travel and nonexistent meal costs if specific documentation is
required for reimbursement and if every employee expense voucher is
subjected to a pre-audit review before it is paid (Mather, p. 8).
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• Restrict access to assets of physical value, such as inventory, to authorized
employees, particularly if the assets are readily marketable and easily
manipulated like jewelry or computer chips (Meiners, p. 53). Conduct
inventory audits on a periodic and sometimes unannounced basis to uncover
pilferage or other misappropriation of non cash assets. Random audits increase
(1) the thief’s risk of being caught before he/she has the opportunity to alter,
destroy, or misplace records or other evidence (Wells, p. 1) as well as (2) the
company’s chances to uncover under-the-table dealings (Tyska, p. 18). Studies
reveal that companies with internal audit departments that regularly perform
surprise audits suffer median losses about one-half the size of those that do not
(ACFE, p. 4). Audits help identify new vulnerabilities, measure the
effectiveness of existing controls, and serve as a guide in the design and
implementation of a better control system. It is also prudent to use a third party
to reconcile sales to inventory on a periodic basis.

b) Financial Control Features
• Since the asset that fraudsters target most often is cash, including checks and
money orders (ACFE, p. 12), it is prudent to keep cash and other highly liquid
assets in a well-secured location. As a further measure to discourage theft
attempts, companies can mine transaction data such as checking accounts,
purchase orders, sales receipts, and other key documents to detect fraud of
these items with good internal audits. It is a good idea to conduct an external
audit on a periodic basis to assess the control performance of the firm and
provide an independent evaluation of current internal audit practices (Mohsin,
p. 271).
• Institute a rule that all company credit cards must be signed out and all credit
card expenses authorized by a purchase order (Mather, p. 8).
• Checks should be signed only after carefully reviewing the supporting
documentation (invoice, delivery receipt, purchase order), and then only the
owner or a trusted assistant should have the authority to sign checks. Audit the
check-issuing process, keep blank checks under lock and key, and make sure
checks are printed using the latest counterfeiting technology (Mather, p. 8).
• Show attention to and embrace responsibility for the financial health of the
organization. Ostentatious displays of excess and disregard or indifference by
managers toward their role and responsibilities is an invitation for employees to
take advantage of their laxity and complacency. A haphazard and cavalier
attitude toward rules and regulations by management will filter down to and
will soon be reflected in the attitudes of employees (Coenen, p. 1).
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• Maintain an ongoing process that facilitates measurement of the impact of loss
control programs. Regularly review and evaluate procedures that are
implemented (Mohsin, p. 271).
c) Organizational Control Features
• Take responsibility as owner for approving all vendors and counting all goods
received or delegate such authority only to a trusted assistant. This will prevent
conflict-of-interest situations from arising, such as an employee owning an
undisclosed interest in a supplier and then negotiating a deal with the supplier,
perhaps purchasing materials at an inflated price (ACFE, p. 17).
• Refunds are a huge cost center in many kinds of business. Institute a thirdparty refund policy whereby refunds are issued only with the approval of the
owner or a trusted assistant (Mather, p. 8).
• Make sure that each employee takes vacation time. This gives others the
opportunity to see the books when an employee is away and to expose any
schemes in which he/she might be engaged. Periodic job rotation is suggested
for employees in sensitive positions in order to reduce the opportunity for fraud
(Mohsin, p. 271).
• Encourage open communication between management and staff. Let everyone
know the company is seeking information concerning larcenous intent and
designate two “bypass” people or “go to” people (male and female) whom
employees can approach confidentially about any suspected theft or fraud
within the organization (Coffin, p. 8). The company can simultaneously create
a “watch-dog” (incentive) program for associates who uncover misconduct.
• Many workers feel outrage when they know there is a thief among them. A
company can cash in on the moral fiber and goodwill of its employees by
establishing a fraud hotline for employees (or customers or vendors) to
anonymously report suspicious, unethical, or illegal activity to management,
with no fear of job loss or other recriminations (Ryan, p. 8). The reporting
medium may be an anonymous phone call, a confidential hotline managed by a
third party, an anonymous letter, or an anonymous message in a designated area
of a website (Wells, p. 1). Occupational fraud, particularly if it involves a large
amount of money, is far more likely to be detected through a tip than by other
means such as internal audits, external audits, or internal controls. The ACFE
has found that 34.2 percent of all fraud schemes are uncovered through tips
(ACFE, p. 28). Getting workers involved in the discovery of unethical and
dishonest conduct is a key element in creating a culture based on honesty.
• Theft is unacceptable. It is a crime, and those who commit it should be treated
as criminals (Schroeder, p. 86). The rapport between management and
employees is reinforced if a zero-tolerance policy is instituted whereby every
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wrongdoer is prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law for every infraction,
large or small, even in the face of police and prosecutorial resistance
(Longmore-Etheridge, p. 74). An immediate and consistent response to theft,
even though it is unsettling to trace through years of historical financial data
and the results may be only marginally productive, sends a signal to the staff
and makes public the fact that those who steal do not do so with impunity and
that the firm is serious about curbing insider fraud.
X. NEED FOR INSURANCE
Every company should have Commercial Crime Insurance (CCI) to cover
employee dishonesty and theft. This policy covers most forms of occupational fraud,
depending on the type of perils coverage the insured chooses. Despite its obvious
importance, however, it is vastly undersold. One study showed that less than onefourth of all businesses purchase crime insurance (Anonymous 1, p.11), and other
studies have shown that too often firms that have it do not have sufficient limits
(McCormick, p. 122).
CCI policies are designed to indemnify the employer against employees who
commit fraud for their own personal benefit or cause the insured to sustain a loss.
Theft in the form of robbery, burglary, embezzlement, commercial bribery, or stock
fraud is covered. The burden of proof is on the insured to prove that a loss occurred.
Unexplained inventory losses are not covered. As might be expected, the policies
contain subrogation provisions permitting the carrier to sue the wrongdoer up to the
amount of indemnity (Wells, p. 1).
The most recent crime insurance policies require the insured to give notice of
loss to the carrier as soon after discovery of loss as possible and to provide proof of
loss, if requested, within 120 days thereafter. While the word “discovery” is not
defined in the policy, the form of notice is therein provided. It is important that the
insured make no accusation about employee misconduct without solid information
(Malecki, p. 94). Further, the insured should adhere closely to policy requirements
about notice and submission of proof of loss statements. Late notice, for example,
may be grounds for denial of an otherwise valid claim. If a loss occurs, the insured
should work closely with an attorney and his agent/broker at every step in the claims
process to ensure that all legal formalities are met and that the carrier’s rights are not
prejudiced (Henderson and Rodriguez, p. 1). Of course, it is not the intent of the
policy to cover employees who committed theft or dishonesty prior to the inception of
the policy.
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Employee Practices Liability Insurance (EPLI) goes hand-in-hand with crime
coverage. When the employer charges the employee with theft and then fires him, the
employer is often slapped with a wrongful termination lawsuit. The EPLI policy
covers wrongful termination as well as sexual harassment and discrimination. The
policies may or may not cover attorneys’ fees (Bruegge, p. 13). Before firing the
perpetrator the employer should, of course, consult an attorney to help guide him/her
through the proper channels. The attorney can also make sure that documentation is
prepared before termination that will limit or control damages and possibly avoid
lawsuits.
The cost of CCI and EPLI coverage is not great. A small employer with 15 or
fewer employees might pay $800 in premium per year for $100,000 of EPLI coverage
with a $1,000 deductible. The firm could add $100,000 of commercial crime
coverage to its business insurance coverage for only $50 per year. Larger firms would
naturally pay more (Bruegge, p. 14).
XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Protecting profits is critical to the vitality and survival of businesses both large
and small. The problem of employee fraud and abuse has so grown in size and scope
that it threatens the underpinnings of business and government. Controlling loss is a
continuing challenge to businesses of every size and type. Since dishonesty wears
many faces, the thievery may be of many types.
A potential for occupational dishonesty exists when there is opportunity for
fraud, the employee has a non-shareable financial problem, and the employee can
rationalize his/her theft. The most cost-effective countermeasures to combat internal
theft are vigilance in hiring practices and the deployment of loss-control programs
such as adequate accounting policies, financial control features, and organizational
control features. An essential element in fostering employee compliance with losscontrol efforts and harnessing the goodwill and cooperation of employees in
identifying thieves in their midst is the tone at and commitment from the top. The
importance of the company’s beliefs and values should be repeatedly emphasized by
management from the date of employee hire to the date of dismissal.
Unfortunately, given recent patterns and trends in the employee theft area, the
future seems brighter for the criminal than for the victims. Employee theft is clearly
on the rise, and each innovation to prevent or deter workplace theft is met with
equally innovative countermeasures as fraudsters continue to come up with new ways
of stealing. Given the magnitude of the problem, the potential for improvement is
huge, and the company that is successful in preventing or reducing the number of
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employee thefts stands to benefit greatly. Reducing fraud helps increase profits, keeps
the business running smoothly, and frees up the time of the owner for concentration
on his/her vision for the future.
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